Formula One was desperate to attract new manufacturers into the sport, having faced a future with just two potential engine providers remaining during the mid-2010s. Audi threw its hat into the ring and was immediately co-opted into the FIA’s working party to create the next generation of F1 engine regulations.
They threatened to walk away unless the MGU-H was banned. This component transformed heat into electrical energy used, amongst other things, to boost acceleration at the start of a race. Having no experience in this technology, Audi feared being left behind by the competition.
Yet ironically, with statistically the worst starts of all the F1 teams in 2026, Audi—with its huge turbo lag—is suffering from its own insistence. The Audi entrance into F1 has been long and convoluted, with the centerpiece of their reason for joining the sport being an efficient and, hopefully, superior engine. Yet the history of the transition from Sauber to Audi is littered with the comings and goings of top-level executives in charge of the project.
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Revolving door approach to leadership
Early in 2024, ex-McLaren team boss Andreas Seidl was appointed CEO of the Audi F1 project, although his tenure was short. His sacking in July of the same year, along with Oliver Hoffmann—the engineer appointed to the main Audi board to oversee the project—was the first indication that all was not well within the Audi camp.
Big chief and Audi CEO Gernot Döllner intervened to resolve internal friction by bringing in Mattia Binotto (former Ferrari Team Principal) to streamline the decision-making process between Neuburg (the engine facility) and Hinwil in Switzerland, where the chassis facilities are located.
Adam Baker was next out the door in 2025. He was the man who originally “blueprinted” Audi’s F1 entry strategy; his departure to a rival project, Cadillac, was seen as a significant loss of institutional knowledge.
In came the highly respected Jonathan Wheatley after decades of work at the multiple-time world champions, Red Bull. As Audi Team Principal, he was immediately neutered, given Binotto retained the main decision-making role, rendering Wheatley little more than the sporting director responsible for trackside matters—ironically, his former role in Milton Keynes.
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A ‘lacklustre’ culture at Audi F1
The British engineer reportedly had significant differences of opinion with Binotto. Some suggest Audi displays a lack of professionalism in the way they are going about their F1 project, and Wheatley refused to accept that.
Wheatley is tipped to replace Adrian Newey as Aston Martin Team Principal, although the revolving door in Silverstone moves as quickly as the Audi version in Germany. So what is the problem with Audi? Compared to new F1 entrant Cadillac, their top-level executive roles appear merely temporary.
What is the issue with the culture at Audi F1? So many top bosses coming and going in a few short months. Well, one could argue it now stems from Binotto, who, when in charge at Ferrari, was known for his poor man-management skills.
Now, a Brazilian journalist has lifted the lid on the Audi goings-on. Speaking to Portuguese broadcaster UOL Esporte, Julianne Cerasoli claims there are big problems behind the scenes at Audi. Without naming names, Cerasoli claims that top-level engineers arriving from other established teams felt the culture was lacklustre and accepted solutions that were second best.
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Audi’s fundamental engine design fault
“There’s an issue I always hear a lot about in Formula 1, and I even heard it within Audi recently. Those who come from big teams to smaller teams have a problem with their mentality. The mentality of, ‘Oh, this is good enough this way,’ is unacceptable to them. No, it’s not good enough this way. They’re always asking, ‘How can we improve this process?’”
Without mentioning the recently departed Wheatley, his years at Red Bull would have seen him as part of a highly efficient organization with the constant goal to improve—even if only by a fraction. This is what made Red Bull F1 champions on six occasions in 13 years. Further, it was the foundation behind the eight drivers’ championships shared by Sebastian Vettel and Max Verstappen.
Audi made a fundamental mistake when designing the architecture of the engine. With no F1 experience, they opted for a large turbo, which is causing them no end of difficulty. Without the assistance of the MGU-H, which Audi wanted banned, the superior design for the new F1 engines is a smaller turbo, like Ferrari’s, which spools up swiftly and delivers the “punch” the car lacks under 50 km/h—the zone where no electrical power contribution is allowed.
The silo approach to engine and chassis
And there’s no excuse for Audi, given their decades of racing in other motorsport categories and being multiple winners of Le Mans and the WEC. Questions are yet to be asked of how Binotto is leading the Audi F1 project, although his short three-year tenure as Ferrari Team Principal suggests he may, in fact, be the problem.
Yet the Audi board itself bears some of the responsibility in the “dual-pillar” approach they decided upon, with the engines made in Germany and the chassis in Switzerland. This, some suggest, has led to a siloed structure, with Neuburg operating under strict Audi corporate HR and procurement protocols, while Hinwil tries to maintain its leaner, independent racing heritage.
In F1, a technical director needs to sign off on a front-wing change in hours. In the Audi corporate world, such expenditures or shifts in strategy often required board-level presentations. Former employees have cited “paralysis by analysis,” where the fear of making a mistake in a corporate environment outweighs the necessity of taking risks on track.
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Convincing high-level British engineers to relocate to rural Bavaria or Switzerland is also a challenge, together with the ‘old guard’ perspective where the project was conceived by ‘Audi lifers’ rather than experts on F1. This changed somewhat with the hiring of Binotto, but the perception of a “closed” culture remains one persistently whispered in the paddock.
The challenges of recruitment, together with the locational difficulties, are tough enough for Audi. Throw into the mix a cultural attitude where ‘anything will do,’ and razor-sharp engineers will avoid the project like the plague.
The question remains whether the “Audi way” can ever truly adapt to the “F1 way,” or whether the project will continue to suffer from the same corporate weight that hampered previous manufacturer entries like Ford-Jaguar and Toyota in the 2000s.
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An Apple a Day: The FIA’s Questionable Cure for F1’s 2026 chronic illness
The enforced break in the Formula One schedule, due to the war in the Middle East, was an opportunity for the FIA to act decisively and at least paper over some of the cracks the all-new 50/50 hybrid engines have created.
There have been several meetings since the Japanese Grand Prix with a variety of expertise present to discuss how to fix the farce fans are watching on track. A persistent critique of the new rules for racing this season is that it’s too much like Mario Kart and a far cry from the raw, mechanical challenge that defines the pinnacle of motorsport.
Yet in Mario Kart, when a car under the super electrical mushroom boost flies past another and into the barrier, there’s little penalty to pay. The driver doesn’t “die,” and even if he does in the world of video games, he simply respawns, ready for the next lap of racing chaos….. CONTINUE READING
With over 30 years of experience in Formula 1 as an insider journalist, I have built trusted connections across the paddock, from race engineers and mechanics to senior team figures. At The Judge 13, I and a handful of trusted colleagues share exclusive Formula 1 news, expert analysis and behind-the-scenes stories you will not find in mainstream motorsport media.
A.J. Hunt is Senior Editor at TJ13, where Andrew oversees editorial standards and contributes to the site’s Formula 1 coverage. A career journalist with experience in both print and digital sports media, Andrew trained in investigative journalism and has written for a range of European sports outlets.
At TJ13, Andrew plays a central role in shaping the site’s output, working across breaking news, analysis, and long-form features. Andrew’s responsibilities include fact-checking, refining editorial structure, and ensuring consistency in reporting across a fast-moving news cycle.
Andrew’s work focuses particularly on the intersection of Formula 1 politics, regulation, and team strategy. Andrew closely follows developments involving the FIA, team leadership, and driver market dynamics, helping to provide context behind the sport’s biggest stories.
With experience covering multiple seasons of Formula 1’s modern hybrid era, Andrew has developed a detailed understanding of how regulatory changes and competitive shifts influence the grid. Andrew’s editorial approach prioritises clarity and context, aiming to help readers navigate complex developments within the sport.
In addition to editorial duties, Andrew is particularly interested in how media narratives shape fan perception of Formula 1, and how reporting can balance speed with accuracy in an increasingly digital news environment.
